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Abstract
Within an antagonistic atmosphere, radicalism becomes an attractive
path for young Muslim inmates who feel disaffected. This is especially
the case for those who are easily manipulated emotionally, due to being
separated from friends and family. Radicalism makes them feel like they
are in the “right” place. This article contrasts the radicalization
processes occurring within United Kingdom prisons with those occurring
in Lebanese prisons. Prisons are frequently designated as the “hotbeds”
of radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism, but in the United
Kingdom, they are seen more as “homegrown” terrorist plots. Focusing
solely on security is insufficient to prevent radicalization. Instead, an
approach is needed that not only strengthens the legal framework, but is
grounded in wisdom and justice, as otherwise further anti-Muslim
backlash to terror attacks will only drive more terrorist attacks.
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INTRODUCTION
The current European economic crisis hit particularly hard the Muslim 
population. For instance, the unemployment rate for young Muslims is 
extremely high in many parts of Europe. The UK is facing more difficulties 
than other European countries because it is currently the top destination 
country for Muslim migrants. For instance, the UK received 43% of all 
Muslim migrants between mid-2010 and mid-2016. Many of these young 
Muslim migrants now feel alienated, disenfranchised, and resentful due to 
perceived frequent discrimination against Muslims in the job market. 
Because of perceived unequal opportunities and a lack of social 
integration, some extremists are spreading their ideology and attempting 
to recruit new Islamic followers to save Islam from European attacks. 
Recruiters practice variant ways in radicalizing new followers but they 
have consistently used mosques, gyms, and university Islamic associations 
as places to spot potential recruits. Usually, they process aside, away from 
the view of the community, such as in prisons, and radicalized in a one-on-
one or small-group setting.
In such an environment, many prisoners have a strong desire to develop 
a need for belonging, group identity, protection, and religious guidance. 
A July 5, 2016 report, submitted to the French National Assembly, 
suggests, “Everyone knows… prison is one of the soils of radicalization.” 
Incarceration gives many young Muslims the “opportunity to be exposed 
to radical discourse and to become involved in radical political or even 
militant activity.”
Historical Overview
The history of prison Islamic radicalization began in Turkey, Egypt, Syria, 
Jordan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Lebanon. Islamist extremists in the Arab 
world have repeatedly used prisons to recruit new followers and graduate 
some of the most dangerous people known sometimes to intelligence 
agencies. For instance, Sayyid Qutb, leader of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, wrote his influential radical book 
“Milestones” whilst in prison. In addition, Ayman al Zawahiri, the current 
leader of Al-Qaeda and a former student of Qutb, during his time in prison 
in the 1980s, became a hardened radical and recognized leader for Islamic 
militant beliefs, where he taught radical understanding of Islamic theology 
and Islamic history in various prisons. Likewise, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
spent most of his time under United States detention in the infamous Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq and after his release became the leader of the Islamic 
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State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL). In addition, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi during his 
imprisonment in Jordan, became a powerful leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
and even recruited followers in prison. Due to the control, these and other 
Islamists have gained over inmates and guards in prisons, petty criminals 
have been recruited by and transformed into jihadists.
Connection between Religion and Radicalism
As a sociological phenomenon, issues such as belonging, identity, 
group dynamics, and values are important elements in the radicalization 
transformation process. The French political scientist Olivier Roy believes 
that suicide terrorism and organizations such as al-Qaida and ISIS are 
new in the history of the Muslim world and the rise of fundamentalism 
doesn’t explain it. He points out that terrorism does not arise from the 
radicalization of Islam, but from the Islamization of radicalism. 
In contrast, wars in the Muslim heartland and foreign policy issues 
are not the only suggested triggers for radicalization. British counter-
extremism James Bradon reminds us “detained Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) men swiftly turned a number of prisons in the United Kingdom 
into centers of radicalization and propaganda.” He views prisons, 
particularly in the United Kingdom, more as “homegrown” terrorist plots 
than any other Western country. Robert Mueller III, Director of Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) goes so far as to suggest that prisons are 
fertile grounds for radicalization. He argues prisoners “may be drawn 
to an extreme form of Islam because it might help justify their violent 
tendencies.”
Criminologist Harvey Kushner believes, Western prisons are one of the 
main recruitment grounds for Al Qaeda. Not surprisingly, Dame Anne 
Owers, former Chief Inspector of Prisons in the United Kingdom, suggests 
that police should spend greater focus on converts to Islam, as supposed 
to be at far greater risk of radicalization than other Muslims are. Babar 
Ahmed, detained in the United Kingdom while appealing extradition to the 
United States on charges of running pro-jihadist websites, has meanwhile 
described prison as a “university of Islamic knowledge.”
Keys Factors for Prison Radicalization 
Socio-economic deprivation, including low education attainment, 
unemployment, and underemployment, are amongst the most common, 
as well as most contested, explanations for radicalization in general. But, 
isolation from the outside world, a perceived sense of victimization, the 
need for belonging, a sense of vulnerability, and prolonged exposure to 
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radical individuals, are all believed to be contributed factors for prison 
radicalization. Which means that socio-economic frustration and lack of 
self-fulfillment, along with bitter experiences of racism, discrimination, 
and Islamophobia can trigger violent radicalization. This enlightenment 
might lead to economist Gary Becker’s theory that “the greater amount 
of human capital a person accumulates, the less likely that person is to 
commit crime.”
David Snow and Scott Byrd write that it is fallacious to consider ideology 
as “tightly coupled, inelastic set of values, beliefs, and ideas.” In fact, 
prisons offer radicalizers an ideal atmosphere for introducing their 
extreme ideologies and doctrines by playing on certain prisoners concerns 
and feelings to gain their trust, garner their support, and recruit them into 
their group. It is more likely to begin through such personal relationships 
rather than through a ranting, wild-eyed extremist “brainwashing” an 
unwilling audience. 
In the United Kingdom, some imprisoned Islamists have adopted a 
proactive strategy to capitalize on this uncertainty by offering food, 
friendship, and spiritual support to new arrivals in prison. Lebanon uses a 
similar approach where the influential prisoners offer a secure ambiance 
for new prisoners in order to obtain their trust. They demonstrate a route 
out of isolation, creating a sense of involvement in a wider project, and 
presenting a vision of a promised victory. Extremists are making the most 
of these circumstances by contacting and recruiting non-radicalized 
prisoners. Hence, according to Olivier Roy, 
“prison amplifies many of the factors that fuel contemporary 
radicalization: the generational dimension; revolt against the system; 
the formation of a tight-knit group; the search for dignity related to 
respect for the norm; and the reinterpretation of crime as legitimate 
political protest.”
There have been a number of cases of young men, often imprisoned 
because of crimes committed in gangs, converting to radical Islam while 
in prison. Joining Islamist groups gives some of these converts the sense 
of comradeship and purpose that they had outside prison, contributing 
to the drowned individuals into radical groups inside prison. Furthermore, 
it is not always clear whether an individual’s radicalization took place 
in prison or happened before. Take, for example, the case of Richard 
Reid, the “shoe bomber” who attempted to blow himself on board a 
transatlantic flight in 2001; he converted to Islam while imprisoned at 
a Young Offenders Institution in England, but many believe that his 
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interest in Al Qaeda only started when he became involved with a group 
of extremists at Brixton Mosque. However, not all people who convert to 
Islam in prisons are becoming radicalized and not every radicalized is a 
terrorist. 
British Profiles 
There is increasing evidence of the process of radicalization inside 
British prisons. Examples include Michael Coe who went into prison 
as a gangster and left as Mikael Ibrahim, a convert to Islam acting as a 
minder for Anjem Choudary. Likewise, Kevin Gardner later recognized as 
Abbas Shafiq, who turned towards extremism during his stay at a Young 
Offenders’ Institution in England in 2006-07. He became obsessed with 
the British Army and plotted an attack on a military base from within 
his cell. As well, Jordan Horner known as Jamaledin,  jailed in December 
2013 for trying to bring Sharia Law to the streets of east London. He 
claimed that he was able convert dangerous, hardened criminals during 
his time in prison. Horner said that he found prisons fertile ground for his 
extreme understanding of Islam and suggested that prison guards were 
“powerless” to prevent his activities.
The recent Westminster killer Khalid Masood is suspected to have been 
radicalized in prison. His actions led Durham Frankland Prison in summer 
2017 to begin the creation of a separate block for terrorism related 
prisoners. The prison authority design this block, referred to as a “jihadi 
jail,” to prevent the radicalization of inmates. Can similar models (a 
“Guantanamo UK or Abu Ghraib Lebanon”) be adapted into the UK and/or 
Lebanon? 
Lebanese Profiles
According to Lebanon 2017 Human Rights report, there were 
approximately 6,330 prisoners, including 4,097 pre-trial detainees and 
remanded prisoners, in facilities built to hold 3,500 inmates. Roumieh 
prison is the largest prison in Lebanon and holds 1050 inmates. 
Unfortunately, as of 2017 it is extremely overcrowded and operating 
at about 300% capacity which represents nearly half the prisoners in 
Lebanon. For instance, the placement of 1100 prisoners with a maximum 
capacity of 400, extremely overcrowded the separate block of the 
Islamist extremist. This overcrowding, the poor conditions of the prison 
and the lack of the judicial system where detainees spent one year 
on average in pre-trial detention prior to sentencing, were supportive 
circumstances for Islamic extremists to conduct a mutiny in 2015. This in 
turn led to disorder and the establishment of alliances between terrorists 
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and ordinary prisoners. A revolt occurred after the prisoners managed to 
steal the master key from a guard, kidnapping 12 others, two doctors and 
holding them ransom demands to negotiate with the government. This 
caused an intervention from Special Forces in the Internal Security forces 
(ISF) in Lebanon to remove such uprising of terrorist forces.
These prisoners pose a serious challenge to safety and security in 
Lebanon. Hence, the Lebanese Interior Minister believes Roumieh prison 
plays an infamous role in the recruitment of terrorists, confirming, 
“Roumieh prison is an operations room for ISIS.” Shortly in 2015, 
extremists organizes a suicide attack perpetrated in North Lebanon from 
within the prison. A raid two days later exposed mobile and satellite 
phones, computers, and even video conferencing capabilities in the 
Islamist Bloc in Roumieh Prison.A similar case happened later in Britain, 
where an imprisoned supporter of Al Qaeda used a mobile phone to direct 
the construction of an extremist website. Prisoners of a segregation unit 
holding convicted terrorists used a “linked system” of pipework to move 
the contraband devices (encased in waterproof bags) passed by inmates 
from one cell to another at HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire.
Why focus on the UK and Lebanon?
This article contrasts marginalization and radicalization in Lebanon with 
what it is happening in the United Kingdom. Lebanon play an immense 
role due to its importance thoroughfare for extremists from Syria and Iraq 
to Europe. Alistair Burt, British Minister of State for the Middle East and 
North Africa stated in June 2018: 
“Lebanon security is United Kingdom security. I am pleased to be 
back in Lebanon and see how the UK, as a strong supporter of 
Lebanon, is delivering its commitment to stand shoulder to shoulder 
with Lebanon now and into the future.” 
This statement highlights the importance of this comparative research, 
because the Lebanese and British authorities are facing a substantial 
challenge, one that does not respect borders, especially after the start of 
the Syrian war in 2011.
Furthermore, comparing prison radicalization rates across these two 
countries has many challenges, especially due to the differences in 
legal systems, culture, language, environment, and many others factors. 
For example, Foley argues that the United Kingdom has continued to 
try terrorism cases through the ordinary courts, but has introduced 
considerable and controversial powers, such as control orders, which 
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“allowed the authorities to exercise extensive control over terrorist 
suspects without bringing them to trial.” In contrast, the Lebanese judicial 
system follows a trial procedure for terrorism applied by military judges in 
front of special courts called “military courts,” which have no equivalent in 
the English legal system.
In 2015, a military court sentenced the radical cleric Omar Bakri 
Mohammed (who fled Britain in 2005) for three years in Lebanon. His 
“voice”  Anjem Choudary, who was urging support for ISIS, got jailed in 
2016 for five-and-a-half years in the United Kingdom. Prisons authorities 
face serious difficulties managing such prisoners, as currently inside 
prisons the risk of extremism recruitment is substantial and produces an 
extremely violent mind-set. Consequently, there is a need to focus on the 
following question: What is the destiny of such prisoners when they will 
be released? 
A case study from the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) in 2018, 
reported a 23 years old male released after three years of imprisonment 
at Roumieh prison for joining Daesh. On release, his relative asked him 
to carry out a terrorist attack against the Lebanese army in the north of 
Lebanon and on a Church, promising to provide him weapons and an 
explosive belt from Syria via Wadi-Khaled, Lebanon. 
SOLUTIONS
Deradicalization
 There are many perspectives of deradicalization. For instance, the United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group 
on Radicalization and Extremism describes deradicalization as “programs 
that are generally directed against individuals who have become radical 
with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least dissuading them 
from violence.” In his seminal 2009 work, Walking Away from Terrorism as 
Horgan defines deradicalization in a different manner: 
“The social and psychological process whereby an individual’s 
commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced 
to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and 
engagement in violent activity.” 
Hence, prisons are important vectors in the process of radicalization and 
they mostly leveraged in the fight against it. For instance, Babar Ahmed 
has written of reading Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones while in prison. This book 
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is manifestly unsuitable for terrorist suspects might support any radical 
ideologies propagated in prison by extremist inmates.
Radicalization has no simple cause and effect. The perpetrators come 
from all areas of society, and it is difficult to predict who may be 
vulnerable to radicalization. Nevertheless, the following potential strategy, 
preventing young people from entering the radicalization process in the 
first place might be efficacious. In an attempt to protect children from 
the risk of radicalization, the British government in 2015 imposed on all 
schools a Prevent duty under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015. Though the UK Government has expressed its desire 
for controversial topics to be debated in classrooms, it is also mandatory 
for teachers to refer children for “deradicalization” for bringing up their 
“concern about British policy in the Middle East” as a potential sign of 
radicalization. There are also, right wing extremist (RWE) disengagement 
programs run in Germany, France, Netherlands and Sweden. The 
Lebanese government, however, has not currently implemented any 
similar strategies. 
Professor Bjorgo interviewed former right-wing extremists and found 
that there are two universal factors involved in disengagement and 
deradicalization. These are classified as push factors or pull factors. “Push” 
factors includes doubting and disillusionment from the group’s ideology, 
becoming uncomfortable with the brutality of the violence involved, loss 
of status from the group and burnout. “Pull” factors includes age, fatigue, 
maturity, greater freedom, not well accepted in the wider community, and 
leaving to establish a personal relationship and/or family.
In May 2015, the Council of Europe launched a three-year action plan 
to counter violent extremism and radicalization, in particular in schools, 
prisons, and on the Internet. In this context, the Committee of Ministers 
adopted guidelines to help member States of the European Union prevent 
radicalization of prisoners and probationers and rehabilitate individuals 
who have already been radicalized. For instance, the Channel program in 
the UK (technically counter-radicalization)  known as a deradicalization 
program despite extremist violence not having taken place. It focusses 
on the ideology of those referred to it, who moves through a series 
of interventions by officials. Prison-based deradicalization programs 
range from informal “chats” between prisoners and imams, to two-week 
intense “courses” teaching prisoners the basics of Islam, to a years-long 
integrated program.
For nearly social prevention programs should address progressively the 
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idea that the risk of radicalization potentially leading to violent actions. 
For instance, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Vice-President 
Christine Beerli notes, “many States are developing and implementing 
various domestic plans to address the root causes of this phenomenon.” 
These states are referring such programs to as preventing or countering 
violent extremism (P/CVE). On the other hand, it is argued that current 
deradicalization programs focus largely on ideological factors and are 
unlikely to be effective in achieving participant’s disengagement. Whether 
these programs are sufficient to counter radicalization leading to terrorism 
is presently unknown.
A concentration of radicalized prisoners may result in accusations of 
racism, prejudice, and profiling, but would also lessen the likelihood of 
radicalization of other prisoners. Alternatively, spreading inmates with 
extremist views throughout the prison system may weaken the strength 
of the individuals, by removing their support networks. However, it may 
result in the radicalization of other individuals and thus lead to even 
greater levels of radicalization. The practice of combating radicalization 
consolidates the perception that fanatical religious ideology causes 
terrorism  and that the holding of radical ideas within a society is the only 
detrimental attribute. Efforts to keep individuals from engaging in radical 
violence are much more focused on the prevention of radical ideologies 
and encouraging the integration of “at-risk communities” (which are 
primarily taken to be “Muslim communities”).
CONCLUSION 
Radicalism inside prison raises the threat of attacks from unknown 
parties. Most people involved in terrorist attacks appear normal, 
unremarkable and sometimes intelligence agencies know of these 
people. Hence, it is important to ask, is our government taking the 
right precautions to avoid the development of radicalization, especially 
inside prisons? Likewise, we should all question whether it is ideal to 
distribute extremists across a number of prisons so that their influence 
and provision is reduced.
While the political landscape and policies in Europe are diverse, across 
the continent the patterns of radicalization are familiar. Cases of 
radicalization in prison are rising and prison environments is linking 
extremist attacks. The United Nations General Assembly adopted in its 
sixtieth session a resolution containing the United Nations Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy. The strategy has shortlisted unlimited conditions 
conducive to the spread of terrorism such as, “prolonged unresolved 
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conflicts - dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations - lack of rule of law and violation of human rights - ethnic, 
national, and religious discrimination - political exclusion, socio-economic 
marginalization and lack of good governance.” Finding solutions for the 
root causes of terrorism, in addition to understanding the common tactics 
of prison radicalization being employed across the continent, is essential 
to prevent its spread. Furthermore, in order to limit the magnitude and 
scope of radicalization in prisons worldwide we need two things. First, 
more research focusing on the efficacy of preventive methods is needed. 
Second, the international community needs to implement and respect 
rules of law. 
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